Op Ed: The iEthereum Webacy

Introduction — From Inaccurate to Harmful

When I first wrote about Webacy’s audit of iEthereum back in early 2024, my focus was on a glaring misclassification. Their automated dashboard labeled iEthereum as a “fake token,” while pointing users to another contract as the “genuine version.” The irony, which I documented in detail, was that the supposed “real” token had all the centralized admin functions that Webacy warned against with the original— and was tied to a phishing address flagged on Etherscan.

At the time, I chalked it up to sloppy analysis. Twice, Webacy seemed to quietly adjust their findings after my article circulated, only to revert back to their original narrative. That inconsistency was troubling enough.

Now the situation has escalated. Webacy’s latest report not only recycles the “fake token” claim but also issues a new blacklisting warning. And while at first glance this might seem like just another misfire from an automated scanner, the implications are more serious. Warnings like these don’t live in isolation — they ripple outward into wallets, custodians, and institutional research. They create reputational damage that is far more harmful than the supposed risks they pretend to expose. In my opinion.

The Phantom Blacklist

According to Webacy’s risk panel:

This is not just misleading. It is a technical falsehood.

The iEthereum token at 0x859a9C0b44cb7066D956a958B0b82e54C9e44b4B (deployed and verified in February 2017) is a classic 2016–2017-era ERC-20 implementation composed of three contracts: Token (interface), StandardToken (core ERC-20 logic), and HumanStandardToken (human-readable metadata + constructor). The actual, callable surface includes:

• Standard ERC-20 functions: totalSupply, balanceOf, transfer, transferFrom, approve, allowance

• Human-readable metadata/public vars: name, symbol, decimals, version

• One optional helper: approveAndCall(address _spender, uint256 _value, bytes _extraData)
  (a convenience pattern popular at the time; not an admin control)

• Constructor + fallback: constructor mints a finite initial supply at deployment and assigns it to the deployer; the fallback throws (reverts) on unexpected ETH.

Equally important is what’s not present:

• No owner/admin modifiers

• No blacklist / ban / pause / mint / burn functions

• No upgrade hooks or proxy pattern

In short: it’s a fixed-supply, immutable ERC-20 with basic transfer/allowance mechanics and a legacy approveAndCall helper—no centralized control levers at all. Calling this contract “blacklist-enabled” is not an interpretation; it’s a fabrication. Yet this invented risk now sits on Webacy’s dashboard as a bright warning many users, wallets, and institutions may take at face value.

Footnote: The iEthereum contract was deployed with a fixed supply of 18,000,000 tokens and 8 decimals via the HumanStandardToken constructor. These values were hard-coded at deployment and cannot be altered. There are no mint, burn, or upgrade pathways — further proof that iEthereum is immutable by design and lacks any administrative levers such as blacklists.

The Genuine Token That Isn’t

Webacy compounds the problem by doubling down on its original error. Their dashboard still labels the immutable iEthereum contract as a “fake token,” while promoting another address as the “genuine version.”

That contract? It was deployed by an entity known as Fake_Phishing6602, an address long ago flagged on Etherscan for phishing activity. Screenshots from Etherscan show bright red warnings: “There are reports that this address was used in a Phishing scam. Please exercise caution.”

The irony is staggering. The contract Webacy points to as “authentic” is actually linked to malicious activity — and contains the very centralized functions they falsely attribute to iEthereum.

This isn’t just a mistake. It’s inversion. A phishing token is promoted as real, while the original immutable token is branded fake. For a company that claims to be building a “safety suite,” this is nothing short in being considered reputational malpractice; in my opinion. I could be wrong in my assumption.

Concentration and Circulation — Another Misrepresentation

Webacy also penalizes iEthereum for “high ownership concentration.” On the surface, this might sound like a fair critique. But once again, context tells a different story.

• Exchange Wallets: Custodial exchange addresses, such as Yobit, appear as large holders, skewing the concentration metrics. These are not individual whales, but pooled user deposits as well as available to the market to purchase and distribute.

• Non-Exchange Holders: Our own analysis of wallet distribution shows that, excluding exchanges, holdings have actually broadened over time. The iEthereum distribution is very fair at this time.

When stripped of context, metrics like “ownership concentration” become blunt instruments that mislead rather than illuminate.

When Metrics Don’t Add Up

Another oddity appears on Webacy’s dashboard: the 628 hearts (likes) attached to their review of iEthereum. At first glance, this looks like community validation. But here again, the numbers don’t add up.

iEthereum is a niche token. Our analytics — newsletter subscribers, wallet activity, community chatter — paint a far smaller picture of current awareness. So how did Webacy’s review amass 628 “likes”?

Two possibilities present themselves:

1. Automated Bots: Engagement farming is a familiar tactic. Inflated numbers lend false legitimacy.

2. Coordinated Manipulation: If not bots, then perhaps deliberate boosting of certain narratives behind the scenes.

Either way, the outcome is the same. A manufactured signal of consensus gives weight to Webacy’s flawed audit, creating the impression that hundreds of people “agree” with the blacklist and fake-token warnings. It’s perception management disguised as community sentiment.

The Real Harm of Blacklist Labels

The danger of Webacy’s misclassification isn’t just theoretical. One of our subscribers — who will remain anonymous — recently opened their Exodus wallet to find the following warnings:

• “This custom token has been identified as unsafe. Sending it could put your funds at risk.”

• “For your security, receiving this token has been disabled.”

To be clear: this did not prevent the user from sending or receiving iEthereum. The contract itself remains fully functional, immutable, and secure. But the warning alone is damaging.

Why? Because it creates fear not only in the mind of the holder, but — more importantly — in the minds of those researching the token for potential adoption. An institution doing due diligence might see that warning and stop there. A developer considering integration might dismiss iEthereum out of hand.

That is the real risk: not that iEthereum fails, but that false signals from “safety tools” prevent honest evaluation and adoption.

The Harm of False Flags

Warnings like these create a cascade of harm:

• Reputational Damage: A legitimate token is painted as unsafe.

• Chilling Effect: Holders feel doubt and newcomers are discouraged.

• Institutional Risk: Larger custodians and funds may rely on feeds like Webacy’s, cementing falsehoods into official due diligence processes.

• Industry Erosion: Trust in blockchain “safety tools” collapses when their errors are so obvious and consequential.

In short: the auditors become the threat.

A Pattern of Inconsistency

This isn’t an isolated incident. As I’ve documented, Webacy previously adjusted its assessment of iEthereum after my article circulated, then reverted. That inconsistency reveals the fragility of their scoring system. It is less a rigorous audit and more a revolving door of unverified opinions dressed up in technical language.

The Exodus warnings prove the stakes. This isn’t just an academic squabble over contract functions. Real users are receiving real alerts, shaped by flawed data.

Who Audits the Auditors?

Blockchain was founded on transparency and immutability. Yet now we find ourselves in an era where opaque third-party platforms — unaudited themselves — hold disproportionate sway.

If Webacy can:

• invent blacklist functions that don’t exist,

• mislabel immutable ERC-20s as fake,

• promote phishing tokens as genuine,

• inflate community sentiment with questionable metrics,

…then what else are they getting wrong across the thousands of tokens they scan?

The stakes aren’t trivial. Family offices, institutional investors, and retail users alike are being nudged toward or away from assets based on red warning labels and social metrics that don’t withstand scrutiny.

Conclusion — iEthereum Remains Immutable

Let’s state this clearly:

• iEthereum is not blacklisted.

• iEthereum is not fake.

• iEthereum has no admin functions — no mint, no pause, no blacklist.

• iEthereum is a 2017 immutable ERC-20 contract with 18 million capped supply, 8 decimals, and fair distribution.

What is fake are the so-called “audits” that fail to verify even the most basic facts on-chain.

The lesson for users and institutions is simple: do your own research, and start with Etherscan, or other block exploreres, not flashy dashboards. The code is the truth. The warnings are theatre. And should tell you something if you have eyes to see and ears to hear.

And to Webacy: if your mission is truly safety, then accuracy must come first. Otherwise, you’re not protecting users — you’re endangering them.

iEther Way, We See Value!